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I. INTRODUCTION
The apparent strict scrutiny1 applied by appellate courts to review courtroom
closures ordered by trial courts should be conceived as a more lenient form of
review. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the
accused has a right to a public trial.2 This ensures that proceedings are not infected
with the unfairness that might be imposed in secret proceedings.3 “Sunlight,” it is
said, “is the best of disinfectants.”4 The right to a public trial has only rarely been
addressed by the Supreme Court, but in Waller v. Georgia,5 the Court set forth a
test for determining when it is appropriate to close a courtroom to the public,
despite the general public trial command. The language of the Waller test suggests
great rigor. Its requirements of an “overriding interest”6 and a closure “no broader
than necessary”7 are the language of strict scrutiny, as it arises in other areas of
constitutional law, including content-based regulations of speech, race-conscious
classifications, and fundamental rights.8 It is a truism that constitutional strict
scrutiny is “strict in theory, fatal in fact,”9 and, despite some protestations from the

* Associate Clinical Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law.
1. When it applies strict scrutiny, the Court requires the government to demonstrate that its law
“furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
4. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1933).
5. 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (adopting test from a public access case arising under the First
Amendment, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007).
9. See infra Section III.A.
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Court,10 the truism is largely true.11 But a canvass of the appellate cases applying
Waller to the review of courtroom closures reveals a test that is rarely fatal.12 Many
closures are upheld as satisfying Waller’s demands of a strong interest and a tight
fit between that interest and the closure decision.13
There appear to be two reasons why strict scrutiny’s verbal formulation,
widely viewed as all-but-impossible to satisfy in other contexts, is commonly
satisfied when applied under the Sixth Amendment. First, in other constitutional
contexts, the interests asserted by the government to be “compelling” tend to be
broad societal interests—“macro” interests.14 In the context of the right to a public
trial, however, the interests at issue are always “micro” interests—the interests of
the individuals participating in the proceedings.15 These micro interests are more
easily agreed upon as justifying the government action under review.
Second, in terms of tailoring, courts reviewing courtroom closures do not
place great demands on the trial court’s choice of means. Of course, in many cases,
a courtroom closure will be one of the only practical choices available to satisfy the
interest presented to the court. Tailoring is about choosing between alternatives.16
When a judge orders a courtroom closed, there are often few other sensible ways
to achieve the closure’s goals. But in many cases, there may be other less practical,
but still possible, alternatives.17 In other strict scrutiny contexts, practicality or ease
of implementation is not considered an important value.18 But in the public trial
context, practicality wins the day. This deference to practical choices is familiar to
criminal procedure tests—a doctrinal area in which strict scrutiny is largely
unfamiliar.19
The Waller test should not be thought of as importing the fatal connotations
of strict scrutiny and should instead be considered a sui generis test—a rough set
of factors to guide a particular aspect of courtroom management. In practice,
Waller’s test is primarily an admonition against closing the courtroom as a matter
of convenience. The test should be considered in its context, as one that
acknowledges the trial court’s leeway in addressing issues of courtroom
management.
In the ordinary course of rulings on public trial issues, closures are often
upheld. Accordingly, it is reasonable to ask, “what’s the problem?” If courtroom
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.’”) (citation omitted).
11. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) (“If strict scrutiny is applied, the challenged law is never supposed to survive
well, hardly ever, taking Korematsu into account.”). But see Ozan O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but
Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1243, (2010) (suggesting that in recent cases strict scrutiny
has been “a test that is strict in theory, but accommodating in fact”).
12. See infra Section VI.
13. Id.
14. See infra Section IV.A.
15. Id.
16. Cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 495 (2014) (explaining, in intermediate scrutiny context,
that “[t]o meet the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government's interests.”).
17. See infra Section IV.B.
18. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C. Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.”).
19. See infra Section V.
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closures are generally implemented in a responsible way, and not evaluated
particularly harshly by reviewing courts, what is the harm of employing strict
scrutiny methodology and rhetoric in the course of that review?
There is a danger that putting courts in a mindset that presumes “fatality” is
more likely to lead to it.20 Given the widely-held understanding that selection of a
particularly stringent tier of scrutiny will almost necessarily result in finding a
constitutional violation, the deck is stacked against the finality of trial proceedings
in which a closure is invoked—reversal should be more likely when strict scrutiny is
applied. Strict scrutiny creates an increased presumption of invalidity,21 a greater
presumption than should apply in the public trial context. Indeed, this may be the
reason that some courts have tried to work their way around Waller, finding
reasons that the test should not be applied in certain circumstances.22 In this way,
the descriptive nature of some of this essay has a prescriptive intent: showing how
Waller scrutiny does work is a lesson in how it should. This essay proposes a
reconsideration of the test for courtroom closures, rethinking whether traditional
strict scrutiny thinking is appropriate in this constitutional and practical context.
That said, this essay does not argue with Waller’s broad outlines. Courts making
closure decisions should consider reasons and alternatives. But the strict language
of Waller’s formula does not account for courtroom management needs.
II. THE WALLER TEST
A. The Origins of the Waller Test
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants “the right to a speedy
and public trial.”23 The Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial has been addressed
in only a few Supreme Court cases. The first to address the right in detail was In re
Oliver.24 The facts of the case were quite dramatic, with a public trial violation being
perhaps the least of the defendant’s problems. The Court reported that:
[T]he questioning was secret in accordance with the traditional grand
jury method . . . . Under these circumstances of haste and secrecy,
petitioner, of course, had no chance to enjoy the benefits of counsel,
no chance to prepare his defense, and no opportunity either to crossexamine the other grand jury witness or to summon witnesses to refute
the charge against him.25

20. See infra notes 986–87 and accompanying text.
21. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009).
22. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
25. Id. at 259.
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The case presented no niceties of whether and when a trial might be “public”:
“the public was excluded.”26 It was a complete blackout, without even counsel
present.27
The Oliver court did not fashion a test to determine whether the right to a
public trial had been violated, describing the right in only general terms:
the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any
attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous
review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on
possible abuse of judicial power.28
Later courts seeking guidance on the parameters of the right were left with
only Oliver’s dictum that “an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends,
relatives and counsel present.”29
The Court’s next in-depth treatment of the right to a public trial came decades
later, in 1984, when it decided Waller v. Georgia.30 In Waller, the court first set forth
its test to evaluate the legitimacy of a courtroom closure.31 The Court first quoted
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,32 a First Amendment case addressing the
right of press access to court proceedings, asserting that the case “stated the
applicable rules”33:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to
be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing
court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.34
Some three pages later, Justice Powell provided a slight rephrasing, asserting
that “[u]nder Press-Enterprise,”35 this showing was required to justify a courtroom
closure:
[1] the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must
be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court
must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and
[4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.36

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 270.
29. Id. at 272.
30. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
31. Id. at 48.
32. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
33. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.
34. Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added)).
35. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
35 Id.
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In this iteration, the closure must be “no broader than necessary,” rather than
“narrowly tailored.”37 It also incorporates another part of the Press-Enterprise
holding, requiring consideration of alternatives.38 As will be shown in a later section,
this is an unusual test for an issue of criminal procedure.39 Instead, this test is akin
to the “strict scrutiny” used in doctrinal areas like the First Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the protection of fundamental rights.40
Mechanically, the reason for this seemingly out of place use of an ends/means
test is that it was born of First Amendment law. In the years preceding Waller, the
Court had occasion to review the issue of open courtrooms in a First Amendment
posture—the availability of access to the courts by the press.41 This jurisprudence
of press access predated and informed the Waller test.42 As noted above, the Waller
test was lifted verbatim from a press access case: Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of California.43 Press-Enterprise, in turn, had rephrased yet another First
Amendment access to the courts test, provided by Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court for City of Norfolk.44 Before setting forth its (and Waller’s) test, the PressEnterprise Court quoted the following from Globe Newspaper: “[w]here . . . the
State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."45
This is classic strict scrutiny language.
There is no descriptive or adaptive language placed between Press
Enterprise’s (and Waller’s) language of “overriding interest” and Globe Newspapers’
“compelling governmental interest.” The change in wording seems to be designed
to accomplish nothing more than restatement of the same strict ends/means
requirement, with the addition of the procedural requirement that trial courts
provide findings from which a reviewing court can evaluate the propriety of the
closure.46
Although Waller’s test for the propriety of a courtroom closure under the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial was appropriated from a related area of
First Amendment law, there remain important structural differences between the
public’s access rights under the First Amendment and a defendant’s right to an open
courtroom under the Sixth. One distinction between a First Amendment access case
37. See supra notes 34–36.
38. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 511 (“Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial
court could not constitutionally close the voir dire.”).
39. See infra Section V.
40. See infra Section II.B.
41. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510.
42. Waller was issued in May of 1984. 467 U.S. at 39. Press-Enterprise was issued in January of
that year. 464 U.S. at 50. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for City of Norfolk was issued in 1982.
457 U.S. 596 (1982).
43. 464 U.S. 501 (1984); see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
44. 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982).
45. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U. S. at 606-607)
(emphasis added).
46. Id.
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and a Sixth Amendment public trial case is that defendants have the power to waive
their Sixth Amendment rights.47 They may not waive the press’s corresponding
rights.48
The most dramatic difference between the two rights is the remedy available
for a violation. In the First Amendment context, a member of the press may be able
to obtain an order permitting access.49 As well, the production of a transcript may
be ordered, and considered sufficient to remedy a public access violation.50 In the
Sixth Amendment context, the remedy is much stronger. A violation of the right to
a public trial can result in reversal of a conviction.51 The finality of judicial
proceedings is at stake in a way it is not when a First Amendment access case is
brought—a newspaper cannot seek to void a conviction. This impact on finality is
further exacerbated by public trial violations being denominated “structural
errors.”52
Structural errors take a variety of forms but are immune from standard
“harmlessness” analysis.53 They are errors that implicate the fundamental fairness
of criminal proceedings, or the proper administration of justice.54 They are
sometimes errors that are difficult to subject to the harmless error analysis
common to most trial errors.55 After all, how can a court determine that the
absence of an individual from the courtroom had an actual effect on the outcome
of a proceeding? Because some structural errors are not subject to harmlessness
analysis—the right to a public trial among them—the finding that a right subject to
structural error analysis has been violated results in a virtually “per se rule” of
reversal.56
Because violations of the right to a public trial are subject to structural error
analysis, a violation of the right that might seem minor or inadvertent may have
outsized effect. Presley v. Georgia,57 another seminal right to a public trial case,
provides an example. In Presley, the defendant’s uncle was excluded from jury
selection in order to keep the courtroom free for prospective jurors.58 It is almost
impossible to conceive of any effect that exclusion had on the outcome of Presley’s
trial. Nonetheless, because the exclusion was considered a closure, and because
the decision to close did not follow the Waller framework, it was considered a
structural error, and Presley’s conviction was reversed.59 This is strong medicine for
what some might consider an administrative oversight in the course of day-to-day

47. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619–20 (1960).
48. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214–15 (2010).
49. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3rd Cir. 1984) (holding in a civil case that
access should have been permitted).
50. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Presley, 558 U.S. at 216.
52. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (describing harm from structural errors as “simply too hard to measure”).
56. Peck v. United States, 106 F.3d 450, 454 (2nd Cir. 1997) (“[A] per se rule of reversal applies
when a structural error is present at trial . . . .”).
57. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010).
58. Id. at 210.
59. Id. at 215–16.
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courtroom management.60 A proper understanding of the Waller test’s functioning
is important given the stakes to judicial administration and economy.
B. The Waller Test is Nominally a Strict Scrutiny Test
In some areas of constitutional law, courts familiarly apply “tiered scrutiny”61
to review government actions. These tiers include rational basis scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.62 Waller nominally requires that strict
scrutiny be applied to courtroom closures. This means that the common description
of strict scrutiny—a test requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring of
means to accomplish that interest63—is manifested in Waller. But strict scrutiny is
more than just the words of the test. It is a judicial term of art that connotes an
exceptionally difficult hurdle to overcome.64 In practice, though, the Waller test is
not terribly difficult to satisfy.65 Thus, Waller is not just another an iteration of strict
scrutiny. Since it does not represent strict scrutiny as that term’s entire “bundle of
sticks” (to borrow a metaphor from property law) would indicate, it is more
appropriate to see it as sui generis; an inquiry distinct from “strict scrutiny” as it is
commonly known.
I have previously described Waller as setting forth a strict scrutiny
requirement.66 That description deserves a little more review. Very few sources
have explicitly described the Waller test as embodying strict scrutiny. In fact, only
one case says so,67 along with one law review article, 68 besides my own. Many other

60. See United States v. Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 299 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating, while reversing
conviction for public trial violation, “[w]e are mindful that many days of testimony, weeks of diligent
juror attention, and months of preparation” were undone).
61. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 945, 948–51 (2004).
62. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (describing tiers of scrutiny in Equal Protection
context).
63. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 812 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[C]lassifications
subject to strict scrutiny . . . must be ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest .
. . .”); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (explaining strict scrutiny as having two parts, the first
requiring that “the governmental ends are compelling” and the second that “the law is a narrowly
tailored means of furthering those governmental interests”).
64. See infra Section III.A.
65. See infra Section VI.
66. Stephen E. Smith, The Right to a Public Trial and Closing the Courtroom to Disruptive
Spectators, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 235, 237 (2015).
67. Commonwealth. v. Chism, 65 N.E.3d 1171, 1178 (Mass. 2017) (referring to “the . . . strict
scrutiny test articulated in Waller”).
68. Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened, Intermediate, or Strict)
Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and Powers Are Created Equal, 10 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 421, 470 (2009) (asserting that Waller “announced strict scrutiny applied to closure of a criminal
hearing”).
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cases have described Waller’s requirements as “strict,” but have not used the entire
term of art “strict scrutiny.”69
But these few references are not determinative. The provenance of the Waller
test leaves no doubt that it imposes (again, at least nominally) strict scrutiny. Cases
applying Press-Enterprise, the case from which Waller took its language, verbatim,70
have regularly described its test as requiring strict scrutiny.71 There is no reason to
believe its “overriding interest” is meaningfully different from the familiar
“compelling interest,” or that a closure “no broader than necessary” is not a
narrowly tailored one. Accordingly, any judge investigating the possibility of closure
will be on alert—her decision about courtroom closure will be put to strict scrutiny’s
demanding test, should it be appealed.
It is true that the means requirement of a closure “no broader than necessary”
or “narrowly tailored,” under Waller and Press-Enterprise, may be legally
ambiguous. Doctrinally, there are different kinds of narrow tailoring. Under strict
scrutiny, narrow tailoring requires that the government select the “least restrictive
alternative” to accomplish its goal.72 That is, the least restrictive of the
constitutional right at issue.73 There are areas of First Amendment law, however,
where “narrow tailoring” is required, but a less demanding form of that tailoring is
permitted. For instance, time, place and manner restrictions are described as
requiring “narrow tailoring,” but the Court has been clear that a demanding “least
restrictive alternative” analysis need not be undertaken to analyze those
restrictions.74 While there are multiple versions of “narrow tailoring” requirements,
there is nothing in Waller or Press-Enterprise that indicates that a “watered down”
version is meant to apply. And again, cases discussing Press-Enterprise consistently
describe it as applying strict scrutiny, not a lesser, perhaps intermediate, form of
scrutiny, employing a less demanding version of “narrow tailoring.”75

69. Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 66 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing Waller’s requirements as
“strict,” though not using phrase “strict scrutiny”), abrogated by Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct.
1899 (2017); Brown v. Kuhlmann, No. 96 Civ. 7530 (HB), 1997 WL 104956, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1997)
(same), vacated, 142 F.3d 529 (2nd Cir. 1998); Concepcion v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 2d 206, 233
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Adams v. City of New York, 993 F. Supp. 2d 306, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (same).
70. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
71. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 293 (2nd Cir. 2012) (reporting
district court’s assertion that “limits to access are subject to strict scrutiny” under First Amendment);
Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (describing First Amendment
access test as “strict scrutiny”); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 945 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(“To determine the limitations of the right of access . . . courts traditionally apply a strict scrutiny
analysis.”), aff'd, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d
1325, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Skelly Wright, J., concurring in part) (“The Supreme Court has most recently
spoken as if closure orders must meet the test of strict scrutiny.”). See also Winkler, supra note 63, at
849 (noting that “lower courts have read Press-Enterprise to hold that ‘strict scrutiny is the correct
standard’”) (quoting Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2nd Cir. 1994)).
72. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
73. Id. (“The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary
to achieve the goal . . . .”).
74. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (disclaiming least restrictive alternative
analysis in time, place, and manner context); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (disclaiming
least restrictive means analysis in commercial speech case).
75. See supra note 71.
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Finally, there is a less strict version of Waller’s test applied to what are called
“partial” closures.76 A partial closure is one in which certain individuals are
excluded,77 or people are generally excluded, but only for a very specific portion of
the proceedings.78 The Supreme Court has never differentiated between, nor used
the terms, partial and complete closures.79 The terminology has taken hold in the
lower courts, however, as a way of distinguishing between closures that require
close attention and those that are perhaps subject to more cursory analysis.80 Most
courts have applied a slightly different version of the Waller test to partial
closures.81 When “partial” closures are at issue, they have diluted Waller’s
“overriding” interest to require only a “substantial” interest.82 This implies that
lower courts understand Waller to apply strict scrutiny, generally. These courts
have fashioned a form of lesser intermediate83 scrutiny at the government interest
phase of the tiered scrutiny approach that they apply to closures that pose less of
a risk to the values of a public trial.
Despite the different meanings of narrow tailoring, and despite the existence
of a less-strict form of Waller review, it remains true that Waller, as phrased,
represents a strict scrutiny approach. It demands a strong interest. It requires a
close fit between that interest and the court’s choice to close the courtroom.
III. THE RHETORIC OF INVALIDITY IN OTHER STRICT SCRUTINY CONTEXTS
A. The Fatality of Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is familiar to every lawyer and judge. Its application suggests,
though it does not require, that a law will be invalidated. It “has usually been
understood to spell the death of any governmental action to which a court may
apply it.”84 “Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that
it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most
demanding test known to constitutional law.”85 The application of strict scrutiny
76. E.g., United States v. Simmons 797 F.3d 409, 413–24 (6th Cir. 2015).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2015).
78. See, e.g., State v. Turrietta, 308 P.3d 964, 967 (N.M. 2013).
79. Garcia v. Bertsch, 470 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has not spoken on
the partial closure issue . . . .”).
80. See Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that partial closures are “not
as deserving [as complete closures] of such a rigorous level of constitutional scrutiny.”).
81. See, e.g., Simmons, 797 F.3d at 413–14 (“Nearly all federal courts of appeals . . . have
distinguished between the total closure of proceedings and situations in which a courtroom is only
partially closed to certain spectators.”).
82. See, e.g., Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2nd Cir. 1992) (applying “substantial reason”
test). But see Turrietta, 308 P.3d at 967 (holding Waller’s “overriding interest” factor applies in partial
closures excluding only some courtroom spectators).
83. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (describing
intermediate scrutiny as requiring a “substantial” interest).
84. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997); Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S.
786, 799 (2011) (strict scrutiny “is a demanding standard”).

456

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

has been said to place a “thumb on the scales” in favor of the right at issue, and
against the law under review.86 It imposes a “heavy burden” on a state actor
required to justify its law.87
Strict scrutiny has been famously described as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in
fact.”88 The Supreme Court has tried to distance itself from the suggestion that the
application of strict scrutiny necessarily determines the outcome and results in
fatality.89 And in 2006, Prof. Adam Winkler described this “fatality” as a myth. After
reviewing cases in which strict scrutiny had been applied, he determined that the
“survival rate” for cases reviewed under strict scrutiny was about 30 percent.90 He
noted that it was even greater for First Amendment access to the courts cases,
Waller’s ancestors. In fifty percent of the 26 cases analyzed, the court let survive a
law reviewed under strict scrutiny.91
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of strict scrutiny’s likely results persists. It is still
said, by the Supreme Court itself, that “strict scrutiny readily, and almost always,
results in invalidation.”92 Justice Breyer, in 2009, wrote that strict scrutiny is “a
categorization that almost always proves fatal to the law in question.”93 And as Prof.
Winkler notes, this remains empirically true at the Supreme Court level: “between
1990 and 2003, the Supreme Court only applied strict scrutiny 12 times, upholding
only a single law prior to 2002.”94 The characterization of strict scrutiny as the death
knell for the regulation under review has not been lost on lower courts, which again
and again note that strict scrutiny is “almost always fatal.”95
This common understanding of the effect of strict scrutiny, and of the burden
it places on government actions within its purview, cannot help but inform the
choices and actions of judges making closure decisions. In the context of affirmative
action, Justice Stevens wrote that “there is a danger that the fatal language of ‘strict
86. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004) (plurality opinion) (strict scrutiny imposes “a strong
presumption of invalidity” with a “thumb on the scales” in favor of the individual right).
87. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (under strict scrutiny, “a heavy burden of
justification is on the State”).
88. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
89. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 237 (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny
is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”).
90. Winkler, supra note 63, at 796 (“Overall, 30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny--nearly
one in three--result in the challenged law being upheld. Rather than ‘fatal in fact,’ strict scrutiny is
survivable in fact.”).
91. Id. at 845.
92. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004).
93. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 366 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(writing that strict scrutiny implies “near-automatic condemnation”).
94. Winkler, supra note 63, at 796.
95. Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 488 (10th Cir. 1996) (strict scrutiny “is almost always fatal
to a classification”); Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 263 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990) (“when a classification is
subjected to strict scrutiny, it is almost always found unconstitutional”); DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 653
F.3d 771, 778 (9th Cir. 2011) (regulations subject to strict scrutiny “almost always violate the First
Amendment”); Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Env't Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3rd Cir.
1992) (“[R]egulations subject to heightened scrutiny . . . will almost always be invalidated . . . .”); North
Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 923 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Under the dormant
Commerce Clause, a statute faces strict scrutiny and is almost always invalid if it ‘discriminates against
interstate commerce.’”) (quoting Dep't of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008)).
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scrutiny’ will skew the analysis and place well-crafted benign programs at
unnecessary risk.”96 Professor Eugene Volokh has expressed a similar concern about
strict scrutiny’s language in the First Amendment context, writing that it “risks
leading courts and legislators to the wrong conclusions, it causes courts to apply
the test disingenuously, and it distracts us from looking for a better approach.”97
There is substance to the standard. Judges and litigants both should be expected to
be aware of and responsive to it.
B. The Purposes of Strict Scrutiny
Every personal right enshrined in the Constitution is an important one. There
is, nonetheless, a hierarchy in terms of the protections extended to those differing
rights. Strict scrutiny, the “most exacting scrutiny,” the “most demanding” form of
review, is extended to few.98 As explained below, it is not employed to review other
criminal procedure rights.99
Strict scrutiny is employed in an Equal Protection context to “flush out”
unconstitutional motivations.100 Laws are subject to heightened scrutiny when the
court suspects that the classification they are based on does not reflect “sensible
grounds”101 or “meaningful considerations.”102 Heightened scrutiny applies only
after the court presumes an illicit motive, which is presumed when, for instance,
race is the instant classification in an Equal Protection case.103 “[A]ll governmental
action based on race—a group classification long recognized as in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to
detailed judicial inquiry . . . .”104
In the Equal Protection context, courts apply a more lenient form of scrutiny
to gender classifications than to race classifications precisely because they are less
96. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996).
98. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 511 (1997).
99. See discussion infra Section V.
100. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to `smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race . . . [and to determine] that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”). United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938), also famously raised the possibility that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.”
101. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
102. Id. at 441; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (“By requiring strict
scrutiny of racial classifications, we require courts to make sure that a governmental classification based
on race, which ‘so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment,’ is legitimate, before
permitting unequal treatment based on race to proceed.”) (internal citations omitted).
103. ELY, supra note 100, at 154 (“[L]abeling a classification ‘suspect’ means functionally . . . that
a prima facie case has been made out and that the inquiry into its suspiciousness should continue.”).
104. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
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suspicious of the motives behind them.105 We believe it is more likely (though still
unlikely) that there is a legitimate purpose behind a gender classification than a
racial one.106 We know that there may be acceptable bases for those
classifications.107 That level of suspicion dictates the level of scrutiny, a reduction
from strict to intermediate.108
Similarly, in the First Amendment context, courts apply strict scrutiny to
content-based laws because they presume there are so few legitimate reasons for
a government entity to restrict expression based on its content.109 Because
government has, generally, no power to regulate content,110 when it does, it is
regarded with the suspicion that strict scrutiny imposes.111 Content-based laws run
the risk that they will be “used for invidious, thought-control purposes.”112
These are not the only constitutional contexts in which strict scrutiny appears,
but the Equal Protection and First Amendment contexts evidence the purpose of
strict scrutiny, generally. It is applied when the courts have reason to believe that
the very nature of the government action under review leads to a probability of
invalidity.113 When strict scrutiny is applied, it is because it is easy for the court to
imagine an improper purpose at play, one that may well be “flushed out” and
rightfully condemned by strict scrutiny’s procedure.114 The presumption of
invalidity indicates that the court expects the law to stem from an improper
motivation.115
This is an ill-fitting justification for applying strict scrutiny to courtroom
closure decisions. One of the purposes of the public trial right is to provide the
sunlight that will prevent the judge and prosecutor from imposing unfair
procedures on a defendant.116 It seems improbable, however, that a trial court’s
105. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 303 (1997)
(“Actions that look particularly suspicious are subject to ‘strict scrutiny,’ those that are somewhat
suspicious are subject to ‘intermediate scrutiny,’ and the most innocuous receive ‘rational basis’
review.”).
106. Id. at 359 (“With gender . . . biological differences between the sexes will remain in existence,
and therefore true ‘equality’ might well require differing treatment.”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996) (“Supposed ‘inherent differences’ are no longer accepted as a ground for race or
national origin classifications. Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring . .
. .”) (internal citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. See Bhagwat, supra note 105, at 303.
109. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that target
speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional.”).
110. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
111. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
112. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 794 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In
contrast, lesser scrutiny applies to laws that “do not pose such inherent dangers to free expression, or
present such potential for censorship or manipulation, as to justify application of the most exacting level
of First Amendment scrutiny.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994).
113. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (presuming invalidity of racial classification);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (presuming invalidity of content-based speech
restriction).
114. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350,
362 (2002) (“It has long been noted that strict scrutiny flushes out bad motives.”).
115. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1996) (strict scrutiny “ensure[s] that courts are most skeptical in cases in which it is
highly predictable that illegitimate motives are at work.”).
116. Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 46).
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desire to engage in nefarious rights-denying behavior is its motivation for a closure.
Less probable still is that the court, colluding with the prosecutor, intends to shield
the prosecutor’s behavior from the public. These are possibilities of course,
possibilities that provide the very reason for the public trial right, but they should
hardly be presumed. Instead, it is easier to imagine proper purposes for closing a
courtroom: protecting a witness’s identity, protecting a child witness from public
scrutiny, maintaining order in the courtroom, or perhaps preventing illness.117
There is little reason for a reviewing court to begin from a position of great suspicion
of the trial court’s motives in ordering a closure. Instead, a proper motivation is a
far more likely explanation for a closure decision. Courtrooms may be closed for
inadequate reasons, and are accordingly due some scrutiny, but they are rarely
closed for wrongful ones.
IV. COMPARING SCRUTINY IN OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS TO THE RIGHT
TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
A. Government Interests
The first inquiry a reviewing court must make when it applies strict scrutiny is
whether the government interest pursued is strong enough to justify the
government’s action.118 One of the reasons that courtroom closures regularly
survive the crucible of Waller scrutiny is that the interests proposed by the trial
court as “overriding” are typically what could be called “micro” interests—interests
in protecting the particular players in the particular scene of the trial. They are
interests that relate to safety, to the emotional well-being of individuals, and to
order in the courtroom. They tend not to be highly debatable as either a category
of protectable interest or in degree of importance. In that way, they differ from the
interests presented in many other strict scrutiny scenarios. In those cases, the
asserted compelling interests tend to be “macro” interests. These macro interests
are typically abstract, generalized interests, inuring to the benefit of society
broadly. They are the polity’s interests, and they may be debatable. This affects how
they are viewed by the courts.
Great judicial debates have taken place over the significance of asserted
justifications for government actions, especially in the context of Equal Protection.
The justices have debated whether maintaining a diverse student body in a
university is “compelling”; a majority concluded yes.119 They have argued over
whether providing role models to minority students is “compelling”; that majority
117. Stephen E. Smith, The Right to a Public Trial in the Time of COVID-19, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2020).
118. See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Under strict scrutiny, [the
government must show its laws] (1) advance a compelling state interest and (2) are narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.”).
119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (concluding school had compelling interest in
student diversity); Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding
otherwise).
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concluded no.120 And so on. The Court has also rejected debatable interests such as
“leveling the playing field”121 and avoiding political favoritism or influence122 in
campaign finance contexts.
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.123 provides an example of the sort of “macro”
interest that the Court is suspicious of. In Croson, the City of Richmond imposed a
set-aside requiring that thirty percent of the dollar amount of any city construction
contract be awarded to minority businesses.124 This quota requirement was
justified by the city as a remedial measure to address a history of discrimination in
the city’s construction industry.125 The Court rejected this as a “compelling
interest.”126 It criticized the justification, saying, “a generalized assertion that there
has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a
legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.”127
It further described the government interest as “amorphous” and speculative.128
An asserted interest may also be rejected as compelling if there is insufficient
certainty that the problem, which may sound compelling in the abstract, is
concretely at issue. For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,
the government wished to regulate violent video games, asserting an interest in
preventing the development of violent tendencies in teens.129 The Court rejected
this speech restriction, analyzed under strict scrutiny, because there was
inadequate evidence of “a direct causal link between violent video games and harm
to minors.”130 This sort of empirical inadequacy will rarely be at issue in a public trial
case, where the needs for courtroom closure are immediately apparent. Brown
presents an inadequately documented social concern, a macro concern, rather than
an easily documented micro courtroom concern.
Less debatable interests, in the First Amendment context, have included
“preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,”131 “ensuring that an
individual's right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the election process,”132 and
“protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors” who view certain
material.133 These may be broad societal, “macro” interests, but they are ones more
easily agreed upon.
Thankfully, there is no need to catalog the Court’s treatment of particular
interests asserted to satisfy the ends requirement of strict scrutiny. Instead, it is
120. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
providing minority role models for minority students is not a compelling interest); id. at 316–17 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (concluding otherwise).
121. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749 (2011) (holding that
matching funds rules cannot survive strict scrutiny).
122. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (holding campaign finance
law does not survive strict scrutiny).
123. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
124. Id. at 477.
125. Id. at 498.
126. Id. at 486.
127. Id. at 498.
128. Id. at 499.
129. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
130. Id.
131. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015).
132. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).
133. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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sufficient to contrast those kinds of broad, debated macro interests with the kinds
of interests that arise in courtroom closure decision making. The micro interests
presented in public trial cases pertain not to the polity at large, but to the individual
participants in the proceeding—the defendant, the judge, or a witness. A micro
interest is more easily appreciated by a reviewing court and is less subject to
political dispute as to its importance.
For instance, an overriding interest required to justify a courtroom closure
was found when a closure was ordered to protect a 12-year-old victim-witness
“from embarrassment and shame.”134 This is not a question about a broad social
issue, but about how one person, in one environment, can be protected.
Besides the prevention of emotional harm, physical harm may be at issue. It
seems indisputable that the physical well-being of specified individuals may justify
a courtroom closure, and indeed, it has been so held: “[t]he safety of law
enforcement officers ‘unquestionably’ may constitute an overriding interest.”135 A
non-exhaustive list of overriding interests also includes the need to maintain order
in the courtroom,136 and prevention of witness intimidation and tampering.137
This is not to suggest that asserted interests are always accepted in courtroom
closure analyses. For instance, a court found no overriding interest in encouraging
a reluctant witness to testify, at least when “the district court made clear its belief
that closure would not protect the witness or his identity.”138 Moreover, “a vague
assertion that ‘disparaging things’ were said by unidentified individuals cannot
suffice to close a courtroom to members of the public during a criminal trial.”139
And insufficient space because of the size of the venire, along with an
undifferentiated risk of tainting the jury pool have been rejected as “overriding
reasons” for closure.140

134. Bowers v. Michigan, No. 16-2325, 2017 U.S. App. WL 1531958, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017)
(citing People v. Bowers, No. 301811, 2012 WL 1560357, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 3, 2012)); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Cty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 at 607–08 (1982) (stating, in First
Amendment context, that “the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” is a compelling
justification for closure); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 168 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the “state
demonstrated an over-riding, compelling interest in protecting a child victim from the embarrassment
and trauma associated with relating the details of multiple rapes and sexual molestation by a family
member”); United States v. Yazzie, 743 F.3d 1278, 1287 (9th Cir. 2014) (“ensuring a child victim's ability
to effectively communicate is . . . a compelling higher value that can justify a closure.”). The government
interest in protecting child witnesses and victims is also manifested in a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3509
(2018), that specifically provides for courtroom closures in child cases. Of course, constitutional
mandates would trump the statute.
135. Moss v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 516, 520 (2nd Cir. 2017) (quoting People v. Ramos, 685 N.E.2d 492,
496 (N.Y. 1997)); Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 110 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“It is clear that the State has an
‘overriding interest’ in protecting the identity of its undercover officers.”).
136. Tucker v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 677 F. App'x 768, 777 (3rd Cir. Feb. 3, 2017).
137. Id.
138. United States v. Candelario-Santana, 834 F.3d 8, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2016).
139. United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2015).
140. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 216 (2010); Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 117 (2nd Cir.
2009); United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 687–88 (2nd Cir. 2012).
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The types of interests at play in courtroom closure cases, whether accepted
as overriding or not, all share the common feature of being about courtroom actors.
They do not ask whether a broad social policy should be honored. They ask whether
a witness’s shame is great enough. They ask whether the danger to an informant is
real enough. They ask what kind of disorder the judge should expect to arise. These
are deeply factual questions, and ones made in the moment by an individual: the
judge. In contrast, governmental classifications based on race are generally (though
not always141) made by a legislative body and are broadly applicable. The effects of
a discriminatory statute are felt widely.
Waller scrutiny arises in a circumscribed realm—the context of a courtroom
proceeding. The closure of the court is attributable to a judge and is applicable to a
particular defendant (or group of defendants) in a discrete case. The societal stakes
are necessarily lower. This takes the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”142 with
judicial review off the table. Courtroom closures do not implicate the democratic
process or take rule-making responsibility from the people. Unlike true “strict
scrutiny,” as it is typically applied to laws concerned with broad social goals,
Waller’s species is concerned with the nitty gritty purposes of courtroom
management.
B. Narrowly Tailored Means
The second step of strict scrutiny requires that the means chosen to effect the
government interest is narrowly tailored to accomplish it.143 Waller phrases its
means requirement as one requiring a choice of means “no broader than
necessary.”144 This is an unusual phrase to use in lieu of “narrow tailoring,”145 but
appears interchangeable with it.146 In a mine-run strict scrutiny matter, a failure of
tailoring is the expected reason for a law to be invalidated.147 Narrow tailoring is
said to require a necessary means, the least restrictive alternative.148 But it turns
out that there are almost always other things a government can do to serve its goal
either without infringing, or infringing to a lesser degree, a constitutional right.149
Accordingly, few government choices pass this gauntlet.
Strict scrutiny typically requires that when “a less restrictive alternative would
serve the Government's purpose, the [government] must use that alternative.”150
141. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (reviewing judicial order for compliance with
Equal Protection Clause).
142. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (coining term “countermajoritarian difficulty”).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
144. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
145. A search for the phrase brings up only 17 Supreme Court uses.
146. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 228 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing strict
scrutiny as requiring a means “no broader than necessary”); California Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n,
453 U.S. 182, 202 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that “full First Amendment protection”
includes a choice of means “no broader than necessary”).
147. See Bhagwat, supra note 105, at 308 n.32.
148. Sable Commc'ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); see Varol, supra note 11,
at 1256 (noting that traditional narrow tailoring “requires the exhaustion of less restrictive
alternatives”).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 808 (2000).
150. Id. at 813.
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There are, of course, innumerable examples; United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc.151 provides one. There, Congress passed a law that
required cable operators either to scramble sexually explicit channels in full or to
limit programming on the channels to limited hours.152 The Court determined that,
beyond these two choices, there were other ways the government could achieve
its purpose of protecting children: there was evidence that cable channels could
block content, on request, on a household by household basis.153 Assessing the
question of less restrictive alternatives, the Court concluded that “targeted blocking
is less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot ban speech if targeted
blocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling interests.”154
Evidence of the alternatives, as was available in the Playboy case, need not be
provided, however. Adequacy of tailoring may be determined by the court simply
hypothesizing alternatives. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Presley v. Georgia, a
public trial case, provides an example.155 In Presley, the trial judge had closed the
courtroom to the public because there “just wasn’t space,” and because he worried
that the defendant’s uncle, the lone spectator attending the trial, might make
prejudicial remarks that the close-quarters jurors might hear. 156 The Court
indicated that it could easily conjure alternatives to closure: “some possibilities
include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to
reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or
interact with audience members.” 157 If there are other choices the government can
make that are less restrictive of the constitutional right at issue, strict scrutiny—as
it usually presents—requires that the right-preserving choice be made.158
But Presley is an unusual public trial case. Waller review, as it is actually
practiced, is unlike traditional strict scrutiny in its means analysis. The means
analysis performed in public trial cases—the inquiry into narrow tailoring—reflects
an inquiry into reasonableness.159 It does not reflect the sort of demands that strict
scrutiny usually entails. Under Waller review, time and again, some sort of
alternative is either presented to courts, or is imaginable, in lieu of closure.160
Nonetheless, time and again, reviewing courts are not so demanding and accept
the closure.161 This result seems appropriate to the task of courtroom management.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 806.
153. Id. at 808.
154. Id. at 815. Sable Commc'ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (suggesting
that, instead of a ban on “dial-a-porn,” “credit card, access code, and scrambling rules [might be] a
satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping indecent dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of
minor.”).
155. See generally 558 U.S. 209 (2010).
156. Id. at 210-11.
157. Id. at 215; see also People v. Evans, 69 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“[W]e can conceive
reasonable alternatives—many of which are based in common sense.”).
158. E.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
159. See infra Part VI.
160. See infra notes 212–229 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
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A judge should not be burdened with determining the best possible approach—the
narrowly tailored one—but should instead need only act reasonably.
If Waller manifested true strict scrutiny, there would always be some
alternative to closing the courtroom. If an informant’s identity is at risk, hide the
informant behind a screen.162 If there is a nervous child witness, let the child spend
however long it takes with a child psychologist. But these measures are not
required, because they would inhibit the normal course of proceedings. It turns out,
the normal course of proceedings is more important to courts than the ability of
some small portion of the public to be able to sit in the courtroom’s pews.163
It may be argued that this adjusted, more flexible, scrutiny is textually
required by the Waller test. After all, Waller not only requires that the means
chosen be “no broader than necessary,” it also says in its third prong, that the trial
court “must consider reasonable alternatives” to closure.164 It may be that this is an
explicit release from the responsibility to choose the “least restrictive alternatives”
under strict scrutiny. Indeed, this may be the “hook” courts could use to conceive
of Waller as a flexible test. The third factor’s use of the word “reasonable” should
suffuse the entire inquiry.
But this third factor, along with the fourth factor’s requirement that the court
“must make findings,”165 seems to be more of a procedural demand than a
substantive one. It makes explicit what is implicit in standard narrow tailoring
evaluation—that alternatives must be considered. And again, the Waller Court
purported to be applying the strict scrutiny test handed down from Press-Enterprise
and Globe Newspapers before it, without indicating it intended to create a new,
divergent doctrine.166
V. TESTS APPLIED IN OTHER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CONTEXTS
Strict scrutiny, as used in other constitutional contexts, is foreign to criminal
procedure decision-making.167 Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment procedural
rights—besides the right to a public trial—are not analyzed using the tiered scrutiny
approach. Without too exhaustive a canvass of criminal procedure’s tools of
scrutiny, it is worth some review of the types of tests commonly used in
constitutional criminal procedure. It may be that practical Waller scrutiny derives
some of its features from them.
Some criminal procedure tests are phrased in terms of categorical rights of
defendants—
162. Compare Hargett v. Giambruno, 291 F. App'x 402, 404 (2nd Cir. 2008) (undercover officer
placed behind screen), with Bowden v. Keane, 237 F.3d 125, 130 (2nd Cir. 2001) (courtroom closed to
protect undercover officer).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Yazzie, 743 F.3d 1278, 1290 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Here, a two-way
closed circuit television or videotaped depositions, such as George now recommends, would materially
change the nature of the proceedings.”).
164. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 33–46 and accompanying text.
167. See Bhagwat, supra note 105 at 303 (“[T]he Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence
where individual rights are concerned—with the exception of criminal procedure—has come to be
dominated by a three-tiered system under which governmental action is categorized according to some
predetermined criteria, and then subjected to an appropriate level of scrutiny.”) (emphasis added).
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whether their rights are violated or not. For instance, under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, past testimonial statements by witnesses who
are not subject to cross-examination at trial may not be admitted—period—unless
the witness is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for crossexamination. 168 But the public trial right has never been considered absolute.169
Many other constitutional procedural rights consider the circumstances to
assess the reasonableness of the government action. A determination of whether
law enforcement has “probable cause” to search,170 for instance, is a “commonsense, practical question” that is evaluated by looking at the totality of
circumstances.171 It is a “nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.”172 Of course, a reasonableness inquiry is built into search
and seizure law. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”173
Similarly, the determination of whether a defendant is “in custody” for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination174 is made from
the perspective of how a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would
perceive their situation.175
The Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel of the defendant’s
choosing.176 However, when a defendant chooses to be represented by a particular
attorney whose selection may lead to conflicted representation (for instance,
among multiple defendants in one case), the Supreme Court has indicated that a
trial court’s rejection of that choice is subject only to review for abuse of
discretion.177 The abuse of discretion standard, permitting the court to choose
between many possible responses, is about as far from strict scrutiny as may be
imagined.178
The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel also includes the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.179 Here, too, a generous standard is applied. All that is
required is “reasonably effective assistance.”180 The right is violated when counsel’s
representation falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness.”181
168. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987, 993 (6th Cir. 1976).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
171. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
172. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
175. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011).
176. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 157 (1988).
177. Id. at 164.
178. Interpharm, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 655 F.3d 136, 146 (2nd Cir. 2011) (“[D]iscretion is
commonly understood to allow a decision maker to choose from a broad range of choices not conflicting
with law or reason.”); see also Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010).
179. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
180. Id.
181. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
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Another example of fact-based, reasonableness determinations in
constitutional criminal procedure cases is that provided by the right to a public
trial’s clause-mate: the right to a speedy trial.182 An objection may be made that the
comparison is inapt. A trial’s “speed” is necessarily assessed by degree. Was one
day required? Were 10,000 days? The space between is not black and white, but a
shade of grey. The public trial right is more amenable to a black and white
approach—the trial was open, or it was not?183 Nonetheless, both are constitutional
guarantees of particular treatment in the course of court proceedings.
In Barker v. Wingo, the Court acknowledged that it was creating “a balancing
test [that] necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
basis.”184 It provided a non-exclusive list of factors to determine whether the
Speedy Trial right was violated.185 These included the “[l]ength of delay, the reason
for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.”186 The Court did not create a categorical strength-of-justification rule
with language requiring compelling, overriding, substantial, or other particular
interests.187 Instead, it noted that “different weights should be assigned to different
reasons”:188
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government
rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.189
This passage does not discuss government interests in the same way as a
tiered-scrutiny approach does. Instead, it acknowledges the practical features of
government actions and needs. Bad faith, of course, is a bad reason for a trial
delay—it is a bad reason for anything. A showing of governmental bad faith will
weigh against the government as it attempts to justify its delay. Negligence by the
government is not to be favored, but it will not necessarily lead to a finding that a
speedy trial has been denied. But in any balancing, a “valid reason” should favor
the government.
In other words, the reason must be reasonable. If this approach is comparable
to any of the tiered scrutiny categories, it is like rational basis scrutiny. Though
perhaps with a twist. Under typical rational basis review, the Court will accept any
conceivable government interest.190 The ad hoc review contemplated by the Court
182. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
183. Though not completely, given the existence of “partial” closures. See supra notes 77–82 and
accompanying text.
184. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
185. Id. (“We can do little more than identify some of the factors . . . .”).
186. Id.
187. See Wingo, 407 U.S. 514.
188. Id. at 531.
189. Id.
190. See Dana Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis Test-Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
373, 375 (2016).
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in Barker naturally requires an actual interest. The government cannot say it could
have had a missing witness; it must have one. A valid reason must be a true one.
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial considers the government
interest—phrased as the “reason” for the delay under review—but does so not in a
strict scrutiny manner, requiring a compelling or overriding interest. Instead, it
simply reviews the justification for its reasonableness. It requires sensible solutions.
Without getting into the detail of these varied criminal procedure standards,
it is clear that they are all fact specific, and they all try to establish whether the facts
presented are of a sufficient weight to “flip the switch” of the right invoked. They
are tests steeped in concepts of reasonableness; what do we expect of our fellow
humans under circumstances like these?
The mechanics of a typical court decision applying strict scrutiny to legislative
actions are very different from those applying it to courtroom mechanics.191 In an
Equal Protection Clause case, for instance, the law at issue typically arises from a
lengthy, deliberative process at a legislative level, and subsequent litigation that
may proceed for years, through discovery, motion practice, and trial.192 The court
has a great deal of time to evaluate and consider the strength of the government’s
interest, or the fine points of available, less restrictive alternatives. In the course of
a trial, the luxury of time is not available. The need for the court to close the
courtroom in the face of exigencies like disruption, or a witness’s sudden
recalcitrance, does not lend itself to the same reflection. The realities of courtroom
management require flexibility that strict scrutiny cannot provide.
VI. THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL IN RECENT PRACTICE
A review of federal court of appeals cases addressing the right to a public trial
over the past ten years reveals a test that is not strict in application.193 Instead, it is
more like the other criminal procedure tests just examined. A search on this issue
revealed fifty-eight cases.194 A somewhat subjective winnowing of those followed.
Some of the cases were not directly relevant.195 Others were habeas cases decided

191. See Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 150 (2nd Cir. 2004), as amended on reh'g, 396 F.3d
53 (2nd Cir. 2005) (noting that courtroom closure decisions may be made under “the imminence of . . .
threat”).
192. See, e.g., Sullivan-Knoff v. City of Chicago, 348 F. Supp. 3d 787, 793–94 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(describing justifications and criticisms of local ordinance alleged to violate Equal Protection Clause and
explaining need for discovery before determination may be made).
193. The search in Westlaw’s federal appeals court database was worded as [advanced: (waller
& overriding) & "public trial" & DA (aft 01-01-2010)]. This may not capture all the right to a public trial
cases decided by federal courts of appeal in the past ten years, but I suspect it was close. The date was
chosen, in part, to capture all the cases that have been issued since the Court’s watershed right to a
public trial case, Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010). State courts, of course, must also apply Waller,
but are not included in this sample.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 296 (2nd Cir. 2012)
(First Amendment case).

468

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

on procedural grounds, or in an otherwise summary manner.196 Twenty-one cases
addressed the right to a public trial issue presented in at least a somewhat thorough
manner. Many of these cases, in turn, involved only “partial” closures, applying a
“substantial reason” factor in lieu of requiring Waller’s “overriding reason.”197
Partial closure cases reduce the demand the courts place on the weight of the
government interest, the first prong of tiered scrutiny, from “overriding” to
“substantial.”198 But regardless of the nomenclature of a partial or complete
closure, eleven of these cases applied Waller as-is, without modulating its
“overriding” standard down to one requiring only a “substantial” reason to justify
the closure. In other words, they employed strict scrutiny’s language demanding a
strong government interest. Of these eleven cases applying “pure” Waller, the split
between the closure being upheld and invalidated was about even. Six cases upheld
the closure.199 Only five invalidated the closure.200 The fact of the split indicates
that, in the public trial context, this is not the “fatal” test strict scrutiny is expected
to be. But more interesting than raw numbers is the reason for these results.
The five cases invalidating closures all did so because the court’s interest
justifying the closure was inadequate.201 This is unusual, given Professor Bhagwat’s
conclusion that the Supreme Court “has strongly tended to prefer means scrutiny
over ends scrutiny across doctrinal areas.”202 All five of these were easy cases. The
interests justifying the closures in four were interests in nothing more than
administrative convenience. For instance, three of the closures were simply for
space reasons.203 Another courtroom was closed by the judge “because that’s the
type of hearing it is.”204 In one case, a witness fear justification was asserted, which
will often qualify as an “overriding” interest, but the court concluded there was no
indication that the witness was really afraid.205 These sorts of justifications are
easily evaluated interests, impacting individuals in a courtroom setting. They
demonstrate practical concerns, and evaluations of reasonableness. In the light of
the Sixth Amendment’s commitment to a public trial, the need for space or
following a “standard operating procedure” is insufficient to close a courtroom.
The cases upholding courtroom closures, and concluding that an interest was
overriding, also did so easily. The interests asserted include the safety of

196. See, e.g., United States. v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (determining, in
habeas context, that claim was not “patently frivolous”).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 77 (1st Cir. 2015).
198. See notes 77–82 and accompanying text for an explanation of the partial and complete
closure distinction.
199. Johnson v. Sherry, 465 F. App'x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Yazzie, 743 F.3d
1278, 1290 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fernandez, 590 F. App'x 117, 119 (2nd Cir. 2015); Moss v.
Colvin, 845 F.3d 516, 521 (2nd Cir. 2017); Tucker v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 677 F. App'x 768, 778
(3rd Cir. 2017); Bowers v. Michigan, No. 16-2325, 2017 WL 1531958, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017).
200. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 548 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Waters, 627
F.3d 345, 361 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 688 (2nd Cir. 2012); United States v.
Negron-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 305 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Candelario-Santana, 834 F.3d 8, 23 (1st
Cir. 2016).
201. See infra notes 203–05.
202. Bhagwat, supra note 105, at 308 n.32.
203. Gupta, 699 F.3d. at 688; Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d at 548; Negron-Sostre, 790 F.3d at 305.
204. Waters, 627 F.3d at 361.
205. Candelario-Santana, 834 F.3d at 23.
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undercover officers,206 protecting the well-being of child witnesses,207 protecting
fearful witnesses,208 and preventing courtroom disruption.209 These are the sorts of
difficult to dispute micro interests typically at issue when a courtroom closure is
being considered. To the extent the concerns are not trumped up, it is hard to argue
they are not interests worth protecting.
The public trial interest analysis, in practice, follows a framework similar to
those used in other criminal procedure contexts. The needs of individuals,
responding to specific circumstances, are at stake. The reasonableness of providing
protection to those individual interests—while keeping in mind that a constitutional
right is at state—is the real focus of the court’s inquiry. Even considering that a right
is at stake, protection of witnesses is reasonable. Closing a courtroom as an
automatic matter, “because that’s the kind of hearing it is,” is not.210
Recent cases also demonstrate the flexibility of Waller’s requirement that a
closure be no broader than necessary—strict scrutiny’s tailoring prong. On this
topic, a review of the cases since Presley may include both “complete” closure
cases, under Waller’s strict scrutiny formula, and “partial” closure cases, in which
federal courts of appeal have reduced Waller’s interest requirement from
“overriding” to “substantial,”211 creating, in essence, an intermediate scrutiny
regime. In either circumstance, Waller’s requirement of narrow tailoring, or a
means selected that is “no broader than necessary,” remains nominally the same.
In none of the twenty-one cases reviewed applying this means scrutiny was a
closure invalidated for failure to satisfy the tailoring requirement. To an observer
expecting a “least restrictive alternative” analysis, this should be a surprise. And
looking at the cases, it is clear that a such an analysis is not applied.
For instance, in United States v. Ledee,212 the courtroom was closed to protect
the emotional well-being of a child witness.213 The defendant wanted his parents to
be in the courtroom for the child’s testimony, but they were excluded.214 One
alternative to closure offered that would have permitted the defendant’s parents
to observe was setting up closed circuit television that would allow them to view
from another room.215 This seems obviously “less restrictive” of the public trial
right, and relatively easy, technologically. Nonetheless, the alternative was
rejected.216 The reviewing court, using language that sounds nothing like a demand
for a least restrictive alternative, wrote they were not reasonable alternatives and

206. Moss, 845 F.3d at 521; Fernandez, 590 F. App’x at 119.
207. Yazzie, 743 F.3d at 1290; Bowers, 2017 WL 1531958, at *1.
208. Johnson, 465 F. App’x at 479.
209. Tucker v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 677 F. App'x 768, 778 (3rd Cir. 2017).
210. United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 361 (9th Cir. 2010).
211. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
212. United States v. Ledee, 762 F.3d 224 (2nd Cir. 2014).
213. Id. at 229.
214. Id. at 230.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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that “[a] certain amount of line drawing is inherent in any closure decision.”217 This
is true, but it is not strict scrutiny.
In United States v. Fernandez,218 the court assumed that hiding an undercover
witness behind a screen constituted closure, and that the right to a public trial
applies to a hearing on revoking supervised release.219 These may be debatable
conclusions, but in any event, the court, making those assumptions, applied
Waller.220 One obvious less restrictive alternative to the “closure” at issue would
have been to keep the proceeding open, and rely on hearsay testimony of the
undercover witness, instead of live testimony.221 This is permitted under Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and, in any event, was proposed by defendant,
which would waive an objection.222 Nevertheless, the trial court concluded “that
live testimony from [the witness] was preferable,”223 and the court of appeals
accepted the determination.224 Again, if a demand of the least restriction on the
right to a public trial were taken seriously, this choice would not have satisfied it.
Finally, for purposes of these illustrations, is Tucker v. Superintendent
Graterford SCI.225 In Tucker, the trial judge completely closed the courtroom to
protect the overriding interest in avoiding disruptions and witness intimidation
arising from the presence of members of rival gangs in the courtroom.226 The
complete closure was entered despite the possibility of excluding only specific
disruptive persons,227 or “allowing certain non-disruptive persons back into the
courtroom.”228 The trial court considered these choices, but rejected them for
logistical reasons.229 In terms of courtroom management needs, the court’s choices
appear reasonable. They do not, however, appear to be concerned with choosing
the least right-restricting alternative.
VII. CONCLUSION - THE TRUE WALLER TEST
Waller should not be read to require strict scrutiny of courtroom closures.
Ultimately, there is nothing especially objectionable about the language of Waller’s
test. The reasons that justify a closure order, and possible alternatives to closure,
should be considered by a court before it orders a closure. But those considerations
should not be viewed through a strict scrutiny lens. Because the formulation of the
strict scrutiny test is familiar to lower courts as something akin to a prohibition, that
reading of the test may be misleading. The particular circumstances and demands
of courtroom management do not lend themselves to review by traditional tiered

217. Id.
218. United States v. Fernandez, 590 F. App’x 117 (2nd Cir. 2015).
219. Id. at 119.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Fernandez, 590 F. App’x at 119.
225. Tucker v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 677 F. App'x 768 (3rd Cir. 2017).
226. Id. at 777.
227. Id. at 778.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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scrutiny approaches and are better guided by the reasonableness inquiries
conducted in other areas of constitutional criminal procedure.
Some courts have puzzlingly declined to apply Waller to courtroom closures
at all.230 There is a danger that they did so because they believed a closure that
might otherwise be eminently reasonable might nevertheless fail when reviewed
under a strict scrutiny regime. But those closures would not likely be invalidated if
subjected to the Waller test as it does and should exist. There is no need for courts
to fashion themselves an “out” that relieves them from Waller’s demands.231
When considering the reason for a courtroom closure—whether there is an
overriding interest—a court should consider the seriousness of the harm asserted
by the courtroom actor whose needs justify the closure. Is the undercover agent
still at work? In this vicinity? Affirmative answers lead to an easy decision, the safety
of the witness justifies a complete closure. Easy decisions to the contrary are also
made possible by justifications of mere administrative ease. Is there a serious harm
to the judge or the judge’s staff if extra chairs need to be moved into the room? No.
These sorts of administrative justifications will never suffice, because there is no
meaningful harm suffered by a courtroom actor.
Somewhat more difficult questions of justification may be presented by things
like child witnesses. It may be unclear whether a particular child needs protection
from the trauma of spectators. But reviewing courts can only presume good faith
efforts by trial judges. There should be leeway in evaluating the seriousness of the
witness’s needs. This is a question of fact, typically left to trial court discretion.232
To make a distinction between an interest being overriding or something somewhat
less than is a great demand. Purpose scrutiny should not be strict in the public trial
context, it should be practical.
In terms of tailoring, courts should ask if the means chosen to protect the
interest—closure—was reasonable, or if obvious alternatives could have been
employed. There are both practical concerns and fairness concerns. Many
alternatives to closure might work to the detriment of the defendant in some way.
To the extent possible, those should be avoided. For instance, putting a witness
behind a screen may protect her identity while preserving the public nature of the
trial, but it might also make the jury suspicious of a defendant in a way that simply
228 Id. See, e.g., Cosentino v. Kelly, 102 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Shepard v. Artuz,
No. 99 CIV.1912 (DC), 2000 WL 423519, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000); State v. Sowell, No. 06AP-443,
2008 WL 2600222, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2008). These cases all declined to apply Waller when
courtrooms were closed in response to disruptive spectators. Similarly, Pennsylvania courts appear to
apply a mere abuse of discretion standard to review at least some courtroom closure decisions. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Copper, No. 1926 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 4233127, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2018).
This has led the Third Circuit to assert that it is “deeply concerned that Pennsylvania courts, including
the Superior Court in Tucker's case, are not applying Waller when analyzing defendants' Sixth
Amendment public-trial claims.” Tucker, 677 F. App'x at 776.
231. See generally Daniel Levitas, Scaling Waller: How Courts Have Eroded the Sixth Amendment
Public Trial Right, 59 Emory L. J. 493 (2009).
232. Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Study, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 1, 44 (2012) (“[T]he idea that by their situation or their experience[,] the trial judges find
facts better than appellate judges” is a reason for deferential review.).
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clearing the courtroom would not. The screen might be a less restrictive alternative
for openness purposes but might impact the defendant’s interest in not having the
jury predisposed against him. In short, judges may be put to the choice of
competing demands. This is a fine, difficult, and maybe impossible assessment. Trial
judges should be given the latitude to make it. A least restrictive alternative
command is too much to ask in the context of managing a courtroom, where the
closure decision is only one of many the judge must make on short notice. Court
choices in this respect are necessarily imperfect. The choice that the trial judge
makes with a good faith intent of protecting the fairness of the trial should be
honored—despite a reviewing court being able to imagine a more open alternative.

